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On August 13, Russian air protection forces intercepted and destroyed 5 unmanned aerial autos (UAVs) near Khmeimim Air Foundation in the province of Latakia. According to the head of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of the opposing sides in Syria, Maj. Gen. Alexei Tsygankov, the UAVs ended up released by militants from the Idlib de-escalation zone.
Over the earlier month, UAV attacks on Russia’s airbase have turned into an virtually day-to-day prevalence. On August 12, Russian forces intercepted 2 UAVs and on August 11, just one. UAV attacks on the airbase also took location on August 10, July 30 and July 21. All of them were being repelled.
The UAV attacks from the Idlib de-escalation zone on Russian army facilities have enhanced as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (previously Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda) and other militant teams are seeing them as one of the very number of solutions to supply problems to Russian forces and to provide a PR blow to the Russian armed service presence in the region.
On the other hand, these assaults show that the de-escalation arrangement does not get the job done. Terrorist teams running in the area are not looking for to be a part of a peace process or surrender. The only thing halting them from a direct progress on governing administration positions bordering the militant-held portion of the provinces of Latakia, Idlib and Aleppo is the open up secret that they will be defeated in any face-to-facial area battle with the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).
The SAA and its allies have retaken Abu Ghanim Mount and secured the Ruhba spot in the province of Rif Dimash in the framework of their security procedure towards ISIS cells. Furthermore, federal government troops state-of-the-art on ISIS cells’ positions in the spots of Ardh Al-Banat, Durs, Shir Tur Al-Hawiyah and Rujm Mughrabah.
At least 17 airstrikes by the Russian Aerospace Forces and the Syrian Air Drive on ISIS targets in the Safa region were being described.
Looking at the velocity of the ongoing SAA progress in Safa, the ISIS presence in the area will be removed soon. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that ISIS will no longer pose a threat to the federal government-managed region.
In accordance to a UN report produced on August 13, there are nevertheless from 20,000 to 30,000 ISIS customers in Syria and Iraq.
The media wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) launched an official statement commenting on rumors disseminated by the Turkish media that 1,300 customers of the Kurdish People’s Security Models (YPG) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Celebration (PKK) may well participate in the expected SAA operation in Idlib.
The SDF media wing claimed that these experiences are untrue and even further stated that there are no negotiations or coordination with “the Syrian regime”. When there is practically nothing new in the truth that the SDF will not be associated in the predicted Idlib progress, there are two fascinating times in this assertion:
- In the August 13 statement, the SDF instantly explained by itself as an entity designed as yet another manufacturer for the YPG and the PKK in Syria. Turkish media had referred to these pretty groups in its rumors, but a reaction came from the SDF.
- The SDF’s claims about no coordination and negotiations with the Assad govt are wrong. For example, in late July, a significant profile delegation of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) – the political wing of the SDF – frequented Damascus for negotiations with the Syrian government. Right after this, SDF-, SDC- and YPG-connected public figures have produced a series of statements confirming the current negotiations and coordination with Damascus in the political sphere and a possible cooperation in the navy sphere.
This scenario exhibits that there is at least a concealed rift in the US-backed group. On the formal level, the Kurdish-dominated SDF seeks to keep its graphic as a reliable “proxy” of the US in Syria and presents an formal media coverage dependent on the MSM text e book. This method, primarily when it is employed around, creates the circumstance that the SDF’s official statements contradict the actions of the SDF and the most influential teams inside it, like the YPG, on the floor.
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